STANDING OVATION. President Richard Nixon and Mrs. Nixon, left, receive a standing ovation from delegates to the 80th Continental Congress of the Daughters of the American Revolution in Constitution Hall, Washington, D.C., April 19, following an introduction by D.A.R. President General Mrs. Erwin Frees Seimes (behind speaker's rostrum). In a 25-minute address to the delegates, the President asserted ". . . We can be proud of the more than two million brave and honorable American men who have fought in Vietnam. . . . These men . . . have done credit to America's highest principles." (Official White House Photo)

COMMANDERS DIGEST

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE • WASHINGTON, D.C.

Vol. 9, No. 29 May 1, 1971

Defense Secretary Laird Tells Newspapermen U.S. Faces Serious Problems 'Beyond Vietnam'

"Beyond Vietnam," described by Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird as "the serious national security problems we face," was his sombre topic of discussion April 21 before members of the American Newspaper Publishers Association in New York.

Speaking before the distinguished group at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, Mr. Laird stressed:

This is, in my view, a particularly timely meeting. I would not want to miss this chance to comment briefly on a matter which is of great mutual concern to the ANPA and to the Department and your profession.

As we look beyond Vietnam to the challenges of the years ahead, rarely before in our history have we needed a closer understanding among those who believe in a strong defense and a strong, free press.

A strong, free country and a strong, free press go hand-in-hand. You and I share an obligation—and a unique opportunity—to preserve and strengthen both of those great national imperatives.

What we need is not to shout at one another. Rather, we need to sit down and talk over together the problems of national security news coverage which have arisen in the past decade or so. It is time for improved professional contacts—contacts that candidly recognize past mistakes and seek future understanding.

Crucial Problems

I welcome the opportunity, as you are giving me here today, to discuss openly

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(Continued From Page One)

with you some of our crucial national security problems. The President's goal of a generation of peace, through partnership, strength and meaningful negotions, is a worthy goal. Our national security programs are linked to that goal.

In this month of April, 1971, I am able to report that U.S. objectives in Vietnam are rapidly being achieved and that U.S. military involvement in the war in Southeast Asia is coming to an end.

Successful negotiations in Paris remain the quickest way to resolve the Southeast Asia conflict. But Vietnamization is consistent with the goal of self-determination, should Paris continue to produce no meaningful results. Vietnamization will bring about termination of American involvement upon resolution of the Prisoner of War issue. In my judgment, Vietnamization will continue to succeed. The problems that do remain are not going to thwart the policy of United States withdrawal as announced by our Commander-in-Chief.

Now the time has come for the American people to think about America's role in promoting peace and security after Vietnam.

Shift Debate

In 1969, when the Nixon Administration assumed office, it seemed to me that we had to shift public debate and discussion from "Why Vietnam" to "Why Vietnamization." It seemed to me profitless to continue an argument about decisions made in earlier years that had committed American forces to combat in South Vietnam. What we needed to do at that time was to shift the focus from what led to increasing levels of American troops in Vietnam to what was needed and what we were doing to reduce American troop levels and terminate our involvement.

It is time now to shift the debate from "Why Vietnamization" to "Beyond Vietnam." It is time to discuss the Strategy of Realistic Deterrence which we have formulated to help achieve the goal of a generation of peace.

The changed conditions in the world today and the demands of world realities called for a new foreign policy, a new national security strategy and a different approach and attitude toward American involvement in the affairs of the world.

The President has provided the new foreign policy and the new approach that emphasize realistic involvement and vigorous negotiation while maintaining adequate strength. And we have formulated a new defense strategy that supports the foreign policy goal and approach of the Nixon Administration.

In the 1950s, you will recall, we had a defense strategy that was widely described as a strategy of massive retaliation. It was a credible or realistic strategy for that decade because we had an overwhelming strategic nuclear superiority.

Retaliation

In the 1960s, massive retaliation gave way to a strategy that became known as assured destruction and flexible response. This also was realistic from the standpoint of deterring nuclear war. In the early sixties, for example, President Kennedy was able to take the stand he did in the Cuban missile crisis to a large extent because we still maintained a four- or five-to-one nuclear superiority. Unfortunately, however, the strategy of flexible response did not prevent us from becoming involved in the longest conflict in our history.

And that is precisely the challenge of the 1970s. We need a strategy for the 1970s that can effectively deter not only nuclear war but all levels of armed conflict. It was that need coupled with an awareness of the realities we face that led to the adoption of what we call the Strategy of Realistic Deterrence.

We call it realistic because it is designed to take account of the major realities facing America and the rest of the world in these difficult times. It recognizes that there cannot be any instant solutions to the problems that simultaneously confront us. And it underscores the fact that the United States by itself cannot provide realistic deterrence on a global scale.

Four Realities

The four basic realities which led to the new strategy are: a strategic reality; a fiscal reality; a manpower reality; and a political reality.

The strategic reality includes most notably the tremendous growth in Soviet military strength from a position of clear inferiority in the early 1960s to near parity today. It also includes an emerging nuclear capability on the part of the Peoples Republic of China.

The fiscal reality involves not only the heavy pressure in Congress for reduced defense spending but the upward pressures of inflation on the cost of everything we need to buy to maintain adequate military forces.

The manpower reality is not yet fully understood. People constitute the single biggest cost in the defense budget. Pay and related costs in FY 1972 will claim some 52 per cent of the total defense budget based on the pay increases we have recommended. It will cost us almost $18 billion more than it did in 1964 for 133,000 fewer people. And in the next year or two, manpower costs will be claiming close to 60 cents out of every defense dollar as contrasted to the 43 cents it claimed from the 1964 defense dollar.

The political reality severely complicates the other three:

—Whether you look at it from the standpoint of the political and psychological effects of Soviet policy and growing presence around the world, such as in the Mediterranean and the Middle East;

—Whether you look at it from the standpoint of political pressures from our allies to maintain forward deployed U.S. forces;

—Whether you look at it from the standpoint of Congressional pressure to reduce those forces; or

—Whether you look at it from the standpoint of gaining broad political support here at home for doing all the things we have to do to assure our national security interests while continuing to reorder our national priorities.

Strategic Reality

The most pressing reality remains the strategic reality. The most essential requirement in terms of national survival remains assuring the adequacy of our strategic deterrent.

One year ago yesterday, I spoke to the

(Continued On Page Six)

COMMANDERS DIGEST

THIS PUBLICATION CONTAINS OFFICIAL INFORMATION, NEWS AND POLICY, DIRECT FROM WASHINGTON AUTHORIZED SOURCES.

Editor John R. German

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Adm. Departs For Pacific Assignment

Defense Drug Abuse Expert Leaves To Command U.S. 7th Fleet

Vice Admiral William P. Mack, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) since January, 1969, has been named commander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the Pacific. He left his Department of Defense position April 30, and is scheduled to report to his flagship, the USS Oklahoma City, in mid-June.

Before his departure, Vice Admiral Mack was presented the Distinguished Service Medal by Roger T. Kelley, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs).

A citation accompanying the award read in part: "Vice Admiral Mack was Chairman of a Department of Defense Task Group charged with examining Defense policies and programs pertaining to drug abuse with the view of recommending necessary reforms. The recommendations of this Task Group led to important improvements and increased emphasis of the Department of Defense program of drug control. He is an acknowledged leader among those in our Nation who are bringing drug abuse under control."

Considerable Changes

In an interview prior to his departure, Vice Adm. Mack noted that there have been "considerable changes" in the DoD drug abuse control program. He said that drug abuse is expected to decrease in the months to come, largely due to U.S. troop withdrawals from Vietnam—a location where our military forces have freer access to drug supplies and over which we do not have direct control.

Vice Adm. Mack cited two Department of Defense major achievements that have taken place during his tenure: career and pay equity for military people and upgrading the importance of National Guard and Reserve forces within the the "Total Force" concept.

"The DoD management structure," he said, "realizes that good people—people that are well-trained, well-educated, well-motivated—are very important to the proper running of all the Services. This particular Administration has done all it can to motivate people, train them properly, educate them properly, in order to have them stay in the Service.

Vice Adm. Mack

Tried for Equity

"This Administration has tried to achieve equity in payment and allowances [for those people] and at the same time it has cut from other areas. The money we have saved has never been at the expense of people; it has always been at the expense of hardware."

Regarding the increased role to be played by National Guard and Reserve forces, the three-star admiral said: "Reserve forces have been upgraded so that they carry increased responsibilities. As we get down in total numbers of regular forces, the Reserve forces will have to play an increasingly important part of the total DoD effort. They [the Reserves] are now being equipped and budgeted for and otherwise reorganized to be able to perform their mission better."

Asked if such increased importance placed on Reserve forces would be a deterrent toward any potential enemy, Vice Adm. Mack said "It would certainly be more of a deterrent than gradually escalating our regular forces. Deterrence is much more effective if you have forces in being, and especially if you count Reserve forces in this case as forces in being."

The 55-year-old admiral, son of a retired Navy commander, graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1937, and spent much of his World War II service on destroyers in the Pacific.

Vice Adm. Mack is succeeded in his position by Army Lieutenant General Robert C. Taber, who comes to the Pentagon post from an assignment as Commanding General, Third Infantry Division, Wurzburg, Germany.

ARMY ROTC UNITS FILL VACANCIES

New senior Army Reserve Officer Training Corps units will be established at 12 colleges and universities throughout the Nation in Fiscal Year 1971. They will fill those vacancies created at disestablished or terminated ROTC units.

Selections were made on a comparative basis from among 42 senior educational institutions which had applied to host Army ROTC units, the Army stated, adding that consideration was given to the applicants' capabilities to produce high-quality officers over a long period of time. Initial screening of applications included on-campus inspection of facilities.

The selected institutions are: Alabama A&M College, Normal, Ala.; Alcorn A&M College, Lorman, Miss.; Austin-Peay University, Clarksville, Tenn.; Campbell College, Buies Creek, N.D.; East Central State College, Ada, Okla.; Grambling College, Grambling, La.; Missouri Western College, St. Joseph, Mo.; Southwestern State College, Weatherford, Okla.; Stout State University, Menomonie, Wisc.; University of Tampa, Tampa, Fla.; Weber State College, Ogden, Utah; and Wisconsin State University, La Crosse, Wisc.

The Army ROTC program is conducted at 279 colleges in all 50 states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico.

— What Is The Nixon Doctrine? —

How does the Nixon Doctrine affect U.S. commitments to regional and mutual defense treaties?



1. **Policy:** The central thesis of the Doctrine is that we will meet all our treaty commitments and that the United States will participate in the defense and economic development of allies and friends. At the same time the U.S. will reduce its military presence, where possible, as our allies provide the manpower for their own defense. Such reductions in U.S. strength are now possible since our allies are stronger and are economically self-sufficient. At the same time, other nations are now capable of meeting regional threats to their security.

2. **The Nixon Doctrine:** President Nixon first stated the Doctrine at a background press session on Guam in mid-1969. As subsequently developed by the Administration, the principles of the Doctrine are as follows:

•—We will honor all our commitments.

•—Where there is a nuclear threat to the freedom of a nation allied with us, or to a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security, we will provide a shield.

•—In the face of other attacks, responsibility must be borne by the countries directly concerned, with the U.S. assisting where it will make a difference and where our interests are involved. Experience has shown that economic development and social reform are the best means of dealing with insurgencies.

•—New commitments will be viewed in the light of a careful assessment of U.S. interests and those of other countries, of the specific threats to those interests, and of our capacity to contain those threats at an acceptable risk and cost.

3. **The Doctrine Applied In:**

•—*Asia*: The United States will honor the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (SEATO), the Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States (ANZUS), and our mutual defense treaties with Japan, Thailand, and the Republic of Korea, China, and the Philippines. *The United States will remain a Pacific power and a member of the Pacific community.* Our contemplated reduction of U.S. forces will not impair the immediate conventional defense of the countries concerned; they will continue to have the protection of the U.S. nuclear shield. In the Southeast Asia region, we will continue to support the efforts of our friends to maintain their sovereignty and security.

(See chart at left.)

•—*Europe*: We remain fully committed to meeting our NATO obligations as well as those with respect to Berlin. We will continue to maintain a nuclear deterrent and a level of military involvement sufficient to offset that of the USSR in Eastern Europe. While continuing to station U.S. forces in Europe, we seek a readjustment of the balance of responsibilities within the Alliance which more

Contemplated Reductions

AUTHORIZED STRENGTH	JAN. 1969	JUNE 1971	REDUCTIONS
SOUTH VIETNAM	548,000	284,000	264,000
SOUTH KOREA	63,000	43,000	20,000
THAILAND	47,000	32,000	15,000
JAPAN	41,000	29,000	12,000
PHILIPPINES	28,000	18,900	9,100
TAIWAN	9,243	8,763	480

accurately reflects the economic and political realities of European progress. We seek a balanced and genuine partnership with the Europeans.

•—*Mid-East*: The preservation of the independence and integrity of all nations of the Middle East is vital to U.S. national interest and world peace. We will assist Israel and other friendly states in meeting their legitimate defense requirements. We will honor our 1959 bilateral agreements with CENTO members—Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey. However, we cannot assume alone the responsibility for developing and guaranteeing peace terms in the Middle East. As President Nixon stated with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict, "In the Middle East, especially, everyone must participate in making the peace so all will have an interest in maintaining it."

•—*Latin America*: We reaffirm our commitment to the 1947 Rio Treaty and the OAS Charter which established a regional security system in the hemisphere. We are committed to continued U.S. assistance for hemispheric development. We continue to support the OAS diplomatic and economic quarantine against the Castro regime in view of Cuba's military ties with the USSR with the consequent threat that Soviet military presence poses in the hemisphere.

•—*Africa*: We will work with African and other nations to help countries not in a position to participate in larger regional projects. We will not intervene in African internal affairs, observing their right to deal with their own problems independently. We are concerned with keeping the continent free of great power rivalry. Consistent with our own interests, we will help our African friends to help themselves when they are threatened by outside forces attempting to subvert their independent development.

References:

Department of State pamphlet, Gist, "U.S. Foreign Policy: Nixon Doctrine," No. 32, July 1970.

Green, Marshall, "The Nixon Doctrine: A Blueprint for the 1970s," Department of State Newsletter, January 1971.

"The Nixon Doctrine: A Progress Report," Department of State Press Release No. 16, January 1971.

LATEST STATISTICS LIST SERVICE TOTALS OF AMERICAN PW/MIA IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

(As of April 3, 1971)

By Country:	MISSING	CAPTURED	Total
NVN	403	378	781
SVN	512	79	591
LAOS	284	3	287
Total	1,199	460	1,659

By Service	MISSING	CAPTURED	Total
ARMY	437	59	496
NAVY	108	143	251
MARINE CORPS	93	23	116
AIR FORCE	561	235	796
Total	1,199	460	1,659

Statistical Recapitulation by Year Lost:

	1964	'65	'66	'67	'68	'69	'70	'71	Total
MISSING	4	54	206	247	284	200	92	112	1,199
CAPTURED	3	74	93	162	113	11	4	0	460
Total	7	128	299	409	397	211	96	112	1,659

Captured Acknowledged by Enemy:

	By Mail	By Propaganda	Total
NVN	334	15	349 (1)
SVN	1	19	20
LAOS	0	1	1
Total	335	35	370

Mail Statistics

	AS OF JANUARY 1969	AS OF MARCH 1971
Total Letters Received	620	4,183
Total Number of Writers	103	335 (2)

Footnotes:

(1) December 22, 1970, a NVN official in Paris, Mai Van Bo, gave representatives of two U.S. Senators what they characterized as "official" and "complete" lists, acknowledging that they presently hold 339 U.S. prisoners of war and naming an additional 20 PWs whom they say are now dead plus nine whom they have released for a total of 368.

(2) Only one letter has ever been received from a U.S. prisoner of war held in South Vietnam; none have been received from men held in Laos.

SECRETARY LAIRD

(Continued From Page Two)

Annual Luncheon of the Associated Press here in this room. The thrust of my remarks was the deep concern I felt that, by the mid-1970s, the United States could find itself in a second-rate strategic position.

I regret to report today that nothing has happened in the intervening twelve months to lessen that concern. Quite the opposite is true.

In December and January, it began to look as if the Soviet Union was slowing its rapid rate of ICBM deployments, after having reached a level of land-based ICBMs that gave them approximately 400 more than the 1,054 possessed by the United States. The situation began to change in February and March, as we reported publicly. More recent evidence confirms the sobering fact that the Soviet Union is involved in a new—and apparently extensive—ICBM construction program. This new ICBM construction effort, coupled with additional momentum in the strategic defensive area—all clearly planned months ago—must be of major concern. Moreover, while we have an advantage in submarine-based missiles today, the USSR is rapidly closing that gap with an energetic construction program that continues.

Hard Decisions

Last year, I indicated that we could postpone some hard decisions in the FY 1971 transitional budget to give SALT every chance of success. We were forced to face some of those decisions in the FY 1972 budget on which I reported to Congress last month. We felt, in the light of the continuing Soviet momentum, as it was assessed late last year, that prudence dictated accelerated development of a new strategic bomber, the B-1, and a new undersea-launched strategic missile system, the ULMS. We are proceeding at the optimum development rate consistent with sound management, but, of course, no procurement decisions have yet been made.

OFFICIAL VISIT. Admiral Charles K. Duncan, left, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command, is greeted by General William W. Momyer, Tactical Air Command Commander, upon arrival at TAC Headquarters, Langley AFB, Va., for an official courtesy call April 12. The occasion marked Admiral Duncan's first visit to TAC since being named to his present position. Saluting in the background is First Class Machinist's Mate G. Guevara, a crew member aboard the admiral's helicopter. **(U.S. Air Force Photo by Sgt. David B. Dyer)**

We sincerely hope for convincing progress in SALT. But failing such progress I must tell you today that the renewed Soviet strategic weapons momentum may confront us with the need for additional offsetting U.S. actions. I would have no choice but to recommend these actions—over and above what has been presented to Congress in the FY 72 Budget—in order to preserve the sufficiency of our strategic forces. We would much prefer success in SALT.

Nuclear Parity

I felt last year and I feel now that the people of America perhaps may be willing to settle for a situation of so-called strategic nuclear parity. But under no circumstances, in my view, would the American people be willing to settle for inferiority.

I can assure you of one thing: so long as I am Secretary of Defense—and no matter the criticism it may evoke—I will never refrain from recommending programs which I believe are essential to the survival of our Nation and the safety of our people.

My job is to provide the capabilities necessary to prevent war, and that is what we are seeking to do under the Strategy of Realistic Deterrence. But while we can never neglect the essentials of strategic sufficiency, we have tried to fashion a strategy that will lead to the effective deterrence of all war, not just nuclear war.

If we are to prevent all forms of war, if we are to restore and preserve peace, if we are to make possible a world in which there can be expanding freedom, we must maintain adequate U.S. strength and help improve the strength of our friends and allies. That is what the Strategy of Realistic Deterrence is all about.

Realistic Deterrence

In its simplest formulation, Realistic Deterrence is the strategy we have designed to carry out the Nixon Doctrine. It is based on the three principles of partnership, strength, and willingness to negotiate. It seeks to steer a prudent middle course between the policy extremes of world policeman and a new isolationism. It does this by providing the means for effective development and use of the military resources of peace-seeking nations to deter conflict at all levels. Except in the field of nuclear

weaponry, it calls on other nations to do more to provide for their own defense—particularly by furnishing manpower. It seeks to foster greater readiness on the part of other nations, individually and in regional cooperations, to increase their ability to defend themselves. It offers U.S. assistance—economic and military—and U.S. support to such nations where our interests are involved. The partnership it proposes means that other nations must do for themselves some of the things we have been doing for them. One of its major goals is to prevent American involvement in future Vietnams.

Smaller Force

Realistic Deterrence means a smaller military force for the United States, but one which is more combat-ready than it has been in peacetime in the past. It means modernized equipment. It means a vigorous Research and Development program to assure our continued technological leadership. It means strengthening the National Guard and Reserves and reducing reliance on the draft.

In our FY 1972 budget, the Department of Defense is implementing the President's Strategy for Peace by completing the transition from a military force of 3.5 million men and women involved in war—largely draftees or draft-induced volunteers—to a truly volunteer force of at least one million fewer men and women who will be engaged in preventing war. We have established the goal of zero draft calls by July 1, 1973.

Let me be perfectly frank. Successful implementation of the Strategy of Realistic Deterrence is the most difficult and challenging national security effort we have ever undertaken in this country. It must be accomplished in an environment of strategic nuclear parity—a reality that leaves little margin for error and no room for failure. It must be accomplished in a period of vigorous Soviet military expansion at sea, on the land, in the air and in space. Nor can we ignore their expanding military assistance programs and their demonstrated willingness to deploy Soviet troops and equipment in other countries.

Free World Resources

What is required is the maximum utilization of all Free World resources for deterrence—not just those, nor primarily those—that the U.S. can provide. That is why, in Asia, we are stressing a greater manpower contribution on the part of our friends and allies. That is why, in NATO, a new spirit of burden-sharing has evolved.

But that is also why it is so important for us in the Department of Defense to have the trust and confidence of members of the press. For it is through the press that we must seek the understanding and support of the American people. Without that support, and full understanding, the goal of a lasting peace—so elusive to so many generations before us—will have no chance for success.

At the beginning of these remarks, I emphasized how important it is for all of us to begin looking beyond Vietnam. It might be appropriate, therefore, to close by calling to your attention important forthcoming talks in NATO.

As we look ahead to the long-range national security requirements of our Nation and the rest of the Free World, the meetings of the Defense Ministers in NATO next month may be the Alliance's most significant substantive discussion in at least a decade. At the Nuclear Planning Group session in the Federal Republic of Germany, and then immediately afterwards at the session of the Defense Ministers in Brussels, I will continue the new level of consultations with our NATO Allies which President Nixon initiated shortly after he assumed office.

Formal Sessions

These meetings will give me an opportunity, both in the formal sessions and in my private meetings with my colleagues, to explain in full detail the new United States National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence.

I will speak to my fellow Ministers against a background of two decades in which the partnership, strength and willingness to negotiate among NATO members have provided peace and stability for that Alliance.

I will bring them up to date on the threat assessment as we see it today, and I will want to hear from them their view of the momentum of Soviet activities, such as the stepped-up naval operations in the Mediterranean, and the provision by the Soviet Union of sophisticated new weapons in the Middle East.

I think it is clear that we are past the day when the United States could or should discuss defense problems with our NATO allies or anyone else with a "big brother knows best" attitude. Not only are we trying to face the realities that require adequate Free World strength, we are seeking conscientiously and systematically to conduct our relations to fulfill our responsibilities on a full partnership basis.

We are not going to preach platitudes to our own people or to our allies and friends as we seek to implement the Strategy of Realistic Deterrence. We ask only for recognition of the realities we face and the determination to meet them together in a timely and effective manner. In that way, we can achieve our goal of peace.

NOMINATED. Chaplain (Brigadier General) Gerhardt W. Hyatt has been named by President Richard Nixon for appointment to the grade of major general and assignment as U.S. Army Chief of Chaplains. Chaplain Hyatt will succeed Chaplain (Major General) Francis L. Sampson, who is scheduled to retire August 1. (U.S. Army Photo)

SUBMARINE DEPLOYED

The fleet ballistic missile submarine USS JAMES MADISON is now at sea with the Poseidon missile aboard. She departed from Charleston, S.C., March 31 and is the first submarine to deploy with this new strategic weapon.

The Poseidon weapon system is a long-planned part of the follow-on deployment of the U. S. Navy's fleet ballistic missile program.

INTERNATIONAL ORDER BESTOWS HONOR ON DEFENSE SECRETARY

Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird was awarded the DeMolay Legion of Honor from the International Supreme Council, Order of DeMolay, New York Masonic Temple on April 15.

In a statement to the young men of the international order, Secretary Laird said in part:

The award which I have received from you this evening is one which I shall cherish.

It comes from an organization that includes some of the best and brightest young men of the Nation. It comes from an organization that will furnish a substantial number of the leaders of our Nation in the years ahead. It comes from an organization that reflects in its purpose and in its activities the ideals that I believe are shared by the great majority of the youth of our Nation. These ideals are the common heritage of Americans, young and old. They give our Nation unity and purpose. They bring us together.

No Generation Gap

With relation to them, there is no generation gap. I happen to believe that the generation gap is a vastly overrated phenomenon.

To be sure, there sometimes are differences between young people and their parents in style and in taste. They don't always listen to the same music. They don't always dance the same way. They don't always dress the same way. They don't always wear their hair the same way. Nor do they always speak the same language. But differences of this kind have always existed between the young and their parents. They do not constitute an unbridgeable gap between our generations.

People Too Wise

Most young people are too wise to believe that destruction of the society is the way to improve it. Most do not want to tear down their country, but to make it work better—to provide for all a fuller measure of opportunity and justice.

Most young people have confidence that needed reform can be, and is being, achieved by peaceful, orderly processes. They understand the difference between dissent and disruption. They know the difference between reasoned argument and unreasoning violence.

Lively Feeling

The young have a lively feeling of social responsibility. They answer the social responsibility. They answer the old question, "Am I my brother's keeper?" with a resounding yes. They feel strong compassion for the disadvantaged. They are impatient to end injustice, discrimination, poverty, and other ills that blemish our society.

I see these feelings as they are manifested in acts of generosity and compassion on the part of young men in the armed forces—young Americans like you who serve their country and mankind.

Reflect Character

These are the things that reflect the character of America's servicemen. And they reflect the character of the youth of America.

For I know that you in DeMolay engage in a wide range of activities that show the same concern for others who need your help.

You give of yourselves for others motivated by the two cardinal virtues of DeMolay—belief in God and patriotism. I hope that these virtues will continue to be your motivation throughout your lives.

I thank you for the award you have given me. I know you in a few years will be setting our Nation's course. I am confident that America will be in good hands.

Rear Admiral Robert S. Salzer has been named to replace Vice Admiral Jerome H. King Jr., as Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam, and Chief, U.S. Naval Advisory Group, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). Adm. Salzer is a graduate of Yale University, Class of 1940, and holds the Distinguished Service Medal for previous service in the Republic of Vietnam.

(U.S. Navy Photo)

SEA Strength Figures Down

The following information on U.S. strength figures was released in Saigon April 19:

	As of April 15, 1971	As of April 8, 1971
Army	218,300	223,100
Navy/Coast Guard	14,300/100	14,800/100
Marines	14,600	18,000
Air Force	40,300	40,500
Total	287,600	296,500
Above is a decrease of 8,900 over the previous peak.		
Free World Forces	67,300	67,300

In addition, approximately 18,000 Navy personnel with 7th Fleet Forces and 200 U.S. Coast Guard personnel are aboard ships operating off the coast of Vietnam.

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